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Following the 2003 Casablanca Bombings in Morocco there was an increased concern in 
protecting the physical and spiritual security of the nation. The state immediately responded by 
issuing a large crackdown on Salafists where many were arrested, imprisoned, and deprived of 
their rights. Due to the rise of extremist rhetoric in the mosques, particularly in rural and 
impoverished areas, the state also responded by closing any mosques they deemed to not be 
promoting moderate Islam and removed their imams. Out of this, a Preventing Violent 
Extremism Program was created that was composed of security and religious-based policies. The 
security policies entailed increased intelligence and arrests, and the religious policies a 
promotion of a state-sponsored Moroccan Islam, the control of all religious institutions and 
education, and the development of an Imam Training Program. This paper seeks to examine the 
efficacy of the Imam Training Program in preventing violent extremism through the analysis of 
newspaper articles, scholarly pieces, and first-hand interviews. The purpose of this paper is to 
show that the Imam Training Program, and the broader Preventing Violent Extremism Program, 
are more effective in strengthening the power of the king as Commander of the Faithful and in 
limiting religious pluralism than in preventing extremism. This study contributes to the 
discussion of preventing violent extremism strategies by suggesting marginalization and 
socioeconomic adversity as targets for action. 
 Key terms: Casablanca Bombings, Preventing Violent Extremism, Imam Training 
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 The 2003 Casablanca Bombing stood as a turning point for Moroccan counter-terrorism 
strategies and religious policy. Immediately following the attacks and over time a series of 
policies and programs have been enacted in an official Preventing Violent Extremism program 
with the aims to restore security and the image of stability and regional leadership. While this 
program has these positive goals to curb extremism and improve regional security, it also has 
worked to promote one homogenized version of Moroccan Islam and consolidated the power of 
King Mohammed VI in Morocco and internationally. The Preventing Violent Extremism 
program is multi-pronged with both security and religion aspects. The religious program is often 
the one praised as preeminent and innovative, however is the program’s perceived success due to 
the security aspect instead? Is the intelligence gathering and the mass arrests what are actually 
preventing attacks or are the religious policies preventing extremist rhetoric and therefore future 
attacks?  
 The Imam Training Program is one of the most important aspects of the religion prong of 
the Moroccan Preventing Violent Extremism program. The Mohammed VI School for the 
Training of Imams (f. 2015), which trains imams from Morocco and throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa, is a key executor of the program’s goals. The school was built and sponsored by the state, 
and the students regardless of their nationality are taught Moroccan Islam, to promote Moroccan 
Islam, and to not support other forms of Islam. This program raises the question: Is promoting 
one form of state-sanctioned Islam necessary and effective to prevent violent extremism, or is it 
more effective in limiting religious pluralism and expanding the king’s power? Islamists have 
generally opposed the king as Commander of the Faithful so by banning their rhetoric and 
preaching, even if they are not promoting violence and terror, is the strategy fully meant to 
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prevent terrorism or to also limit opposition? While Moroccan’s may not have a lot of faith in the 
government, they do in their imams. Imams are trusted leaders of the community who are obeyed 
by those that follow them. By promoting the king’s message as the only ‘right’ message through 
the training of imams, the king’s policies are being transmitted to the imams’ communities. Since 
the communities generally listen to the lessons and guidance of their imams, they are giving 
legitimacy and power to the king’s religious and political messages.   
 Considering these factors what is then the efficacy of the Imam Training Program in 
preventing violent extremism? Is it more effective in achieving its other unstated goals? Would 
other strategies be more effective? Would an alteration or synthesis of current strategies be more 
productive? It has been 17 years since the attacks and 5 years since the Imam Training School 
was opened, so is it too soon to tell? How and when will we know if the moderate message is 
taking root in all regions rich and poor? How and when will we know if the program is, in fact, 
preventing acts of terror which garners it so much international praise? 
 When beginning my research, I started with the broad question: How did the Moroccan 
government work to contradict the extremist ideas of the 2003 Casablanca bombing attackers to 
both a domestic and international audience? However, because of the time constraints and the 
many methodologies employed by the Moroccan government to achieve these goals, I am 
focusing my research on the Moroccan Imam Training Program. My question is: How was/is the 
Imams Training Program used as a tool to counter violent extremism? As follow-up questions I 
will ask: Why does the official concern on imams as an agent to counter violent extremism exist? 
And: To what extent and in which ways has the training program served this goal? 
 My paper starts by examining the 2003 Casablanca Bombing and the reactions to it. 
Secondly, I examine Morocco’s Preventing Violent Extremism strategies as a whole, then I go 
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on to explore the structure of the Imam Training Program in detail. I lastly examine the efficacy 
of the Imam Training Program and how it might be achieving other goals than preventing violent 
terror.  
Assumptions and Methodology 
 In light of the COVID-19 epidemic, I was forced to return to the United States from 
Morocco before the commencement of the ISP period. Because of this, I was unable to conduct 
numerous in-person interviews with Moroccan imams, historians, and civilians as I had hoped. I 
had planned to conduct interviews and site visits in Rabat, Casablanca, and Fes. I am spending 
the ISP period quarantined at my home in New Jersey, so I shifted the methodology for my 
research to an analysis of pre-existing sources and a few virtual interviews. My research sites 
included scholarly online databases, online newspaper articles, written and video interviews 
conducted by news sources, lectures given to the Multiculturalism and Human Rights Program, 
human rights analyses, and Webex. I looked at articles, data, and reports from the 2003 
Casablanca Bombing to the present in order to analyze the effects of the bombing and the 
responses by the state. I specifically looked to focus on the role and effects of the Imam Training 
Program on preventing violent extremism in Morocco. I looked at a wide variety of sources, both 
state and private, domestic and international, and hope that in doing so I eliminated potential 
sources for bias and worked to show every side of my argument.  
 For my interviews, I conducted three qualitative interviews with open-ended responses. 
These interviews were conducted with experts, two Moroccan and one American, and were 
conducted over the Webex video chat platform. Each participant was asked to sign a consent 
form and gave permission for the audio to be recorded and for their names to be used in the 
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course of my research. Conducting interviews with experts added depth to the arguments made 
in my paper and gave years of first-hand experience that I do not have. 
 In this paper, the Literature Review and Analysis sections were combined since my 
project began as an analysis of preexisting sources. The contents of my sources, interviews, and 
analysis are intertwined throughout the body of this paper.  
 Before beginning my research, I assumed that the Imam Training Program would be 
widely supported by its participants and that they would also have high praise for the king as 
Commander of the Faithful. I believed that the training program was an important part of a 
grander strategy to combat violent extremism but did not know if it was effective in promoting 
moderate Islam or also in consolidating the power of the monarch in the region. Based on my 
experience living and learning in Morocco, I assumed that the king would work to increase his 
own power by any means and that state-run efforts might always have this as an underlying 
motivator. This research seeks to explore the Imam Training Program, and the broader 
Preventing Violent Extremism program, to determine if it is actually effective in achieving its 
stated goal.  
Literature Review and Analysis 
The Casablanca Bombing 
The Events and their Perpetrators  
 The Moroccan Preventing Violent Extremism program, and consequently the Imam 
Training Program, were born out of what is considered the September eleventh of Morocco, the 
2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks. According to Krueger and Maleckova (2003), “The term 
“terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
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an audience”. These acts of terrorism, committed by Salafia Jihadia which is an Al-Qaeda 
affiliate, greatly undermined Moroccan feelings of stability and exceptionalism (Hmimnat, 2019, 
p. 38). The Casablanca attacks occurred on May 16, 2003 and were a series of coordinated 
strikes at a Spanish cultural center, the Belgian consulate, a Jewish community center, and the 
Farah Maghreb Hotel (Jehl, 2003). On the day of the attacks, NPR’s Eric Westervelt reported 
that “like the attacks in Saudi Arabia on Monday…it appears the terrorists [were] more targeting 
Western business and political interests and regimes with ties to the US, not just specific 
American targets” (Simon, 2003). Morocco has long had “close diplomatic relations with the US 
and European countries and the kingdom has cooperated in the war on terrorism. In addition, 
fundamentalists have long detested Morocco's moderate stance toward Israel” (Simon, 2003). As 
a result of the various attacks, at least forty people were killed, and sixty people were injured 
from a mix of car bombs and body explosives (Simon, 2003).  
 It is often believed that perpetrators of terrorist attacks such as this come from vulnerable, 
impoverished communities. In Morocco, “[a]t least 70% of the population is under the age of 30, 
coupled with high youth unemployment, which stands at 21.4%” and according to Boulter 
(2016) this indicates that “there is plenty of fertile ground for terror recruiters to coax 
disillusioned young men, and women, into pursuing jihadist activities”. Boulter (2016) also notes 
that the “the individuals recruited were all young men, with origins in the Casablanca slum of 
Sidi Moumin”. NPR’s Scott Westervelt also believed that “the slums of Casablanca have been 
something of a centerpiece for growing Muslim fundamentalism in Morocco” (Simon, 2003). 
However, in 2005 the New York Times reported that:  
In the four attacks for which the most complete information about the perpetrators' 
educational levels is available -- the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the attacks on 
the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the 9/11 attacks, and the Bali 
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bombings in 2002 -- 53 percent of the terrorists had either attended college or had 
received a college degree. As a point of reference, only 52 percent of Americans have 
been to college. The terrorists in our study thus appear, on average, to be as well educated 
as many Americans. (Bergen and Pandey, 2005)  
Sadik Rddad agrees that there is often this false claim that fundamentalists are ignorant or did not 
go to school and says that many are smart, even engineers or doctors (Sadik Rddad, personal 
communication, May 9, 2020). Rddad also says that it is easy for them to recruit young people 
by appealing to polarizing issues such as Palestine, presenting Muslims as victims of the West,  
and stating that you are not a good Muslim unless you violently stand up against those who are 
killing your brothers (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 2020). As there are many 
conflicting scholarly studies and resulting conclusions on whether poverty breeds 
fundamentalism, it is difficult to determine from existing literature if targeting those 
communities is an effective tool in a religion-based preventing violent extremism program. 
Responses by the Moroccan State 
  After the 2003 terrorist attacks, the Moroccan state aimed to restore the image of 
Moroccan Islam as having the values of “moderation, tolerance, and interfaith coexistence” 
through a combination of religion and security-based policies (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 39). Due to the 
abrupt change in both the domestic and international perception of Morocco’s stability and 
security, the state had to act quickly to address both the bombing and the factors they perceived 
to have caused it. These reactions included mass arrests of about 2,000 suspected Salafi 
extremists. These mass arrests were carried out along with “home searches without judicial 
warrants, mostly in poor neighborhoods that are suspected Islamist strongholds…Many reported 
that they were then transported to a detention center in Temara, outside Rabat, that is operated by 
the General Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory” (Dakwar, 2004, p. 2). In addition to 
the limited human rights afforded in this detention facility, “[m]any suspects were convicted and 
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sentenced before October 1, 2003 – the date an amendment to the Criminal Procedural Code 
went into force and granted defendants the right to appeal their convictions on the facts” 
(Dakwar, 2004, p. 2). The reactions also included support for anti-terror and anti-money-
laundering legislation, the 2015 creation of the Central Bureau of Judiciary Investigations, social 
and human development programs (INDH), religious reforms to curb Wahabism and Salafi 
Jihadism, 2004 Family Code reforms, and discussions with/conversions of Salafists (Hmimnat, 
2019, p. 39). In May 2017, the Reconciliation Program was launched to reconcile jihadists with 
the self, religious texts, and society so that these prisoners could be reintegrated (Hmimnat, 
2019). However, this program has been very selective in who can participate, and many who 
participated were granted royal pardons thereby giving Jihadist inmates an incentive to 
participate in spite of their religious beliefs. As an example, Sheikh Umar al-Hadouchi, a Salafist 
preacher imprisoned for his association with the bombing, was pardoned in 2011 (Sheline, 2019, 
p. 8). However, in 2013, he “participated in a dialogue organized by an affiliate of the PJD 
intended to reduce ideological division. He also issued a fatwa condemning Moroccans who 
traveled to fight for the Islamic State. He represents a figure previously affiliated with terrorism, 
but who subsequently rejected violence” (Sheline, 2019, p. 8). The religious scholars who lead 
the program all belong to the official religious establishment and therefore promote the state’s 
interpretations and discredit others (Hmimnat, 2019). Many of these Salafists joined the 
Renaissance and Virtue Party which has moved to support the king’s legitimacy and to 
participate in formal politics (Zerhouni and Akesbi, 2016). It appears that by working to convert 
and pardon these prominent Salafists, the king not only aimed to quell extremist rhetoric but also 









 These actions to restore security and faith in the nation after the 2003 Casablanca 
Bombing were organized into a multi-pronged effort known as the Preventing Violent 
Extremism (PVE) program. The questions I aim to explore in this section are: How much 
religious freedom does the constitution guarantee and are those freedoms enforced? And: If yes, 
does the PVE program further limit religious freedoms in Morocco? 
 After the attack, the state aimed to “reshape the official version of Islam” and to 
“strengthen the religious bureaucracy's central role” (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 39). The state needed to 
create a large marketing strategy as political, economic, and tourism reputations were at risk. The 
PVE program combined security-based and religious-based strategies, with 
“religion…intensively incorporated as a crucial component”, in order to effectively address the 
threats to Morocco made apparent by the bombing (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 36). The goals of this 
program were “Islamization from above, safeguard[ing] spiritual security, [and] 
immuniz[ing]…against threatening opponents,” which include Islamist movements, Salafists, 
Shiites, and Christian proselytizing missionaries (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 39). The state also adopted 
development projects in shanty towns since they believed that poor, young, unemployed people 
are easy prey to fundamentalist groups and wanted to counterbalance that narrative (Sadik 
Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 2020). We do not know the efficacy of these 
development programs realized in these communities. While these goals aimed to protect the 
present and future security of the Moroccan people, they also consolidated the power of the king 
and limited religious pluralism. The security-based policies may have been the teeth in the PVE 
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In addition to the mass arrests of Salafists and state support for anti-terror legislation, the 
state’s intelligence and security services have developed significantly as a response to the 
Casablanca attacks. Sheikh Mohamed Fizazi, who inspired many young radicals, was sentenced 
for 30 years on charges connected to the attack (Boulter, 2016). On Mar 20, 2007 the King’s 
Public Prosecutor stated that Saad Houssaini, a prominent Islamic combatant and leader, was 
referred to the Rabat Appeal Court “under charges of undermining national security by receiving 
funds intended to finance acts compromising the security of the state, as well as forming a gang 
to plan and carry out terrorist acts which seriously undermine the public order” (BBC Monitoring 
Middle East, 2007). In January 2015, “The country´s new judicial body, or Central Bureau of 
Judicial Investigations…was established as part of amended anti-terror legislation” (Boulter, 
2016). It “has been instrumental in uncovering jihadist groups. In the first six months of its 
creation, it had thwarted the activities of at least 15 terror cells” (Boulter, 2016). In the same year 
as the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations’ founding, approximately 300 Moroccan 
jihadists went to fight for the Islamic State in Libya and the Moroccan authorities arrested groups 
of jihadists with links to them in three cities (Boulter, 2016). Also, in 2015, an Islamic State 
group known as the Caliphate Soldiers in Morocco was broken up in Essaouira (Boulter, 2016). 
“According to the latest figures published by the…Bureau…187 terrorist cells planning terrorist 
actions in the Kingdom were dismantled in the period between 2002 until January 2019, and 
more than 3,202 people were arrested” (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 37). These impressive statistics show 
that Morocco is being proactive in combatting terrorism from a security-based perspective, but 
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they also show that the nation is not being ‘immunized’ from extremism (Hmimnat, 2019). If the 
PVE program was as successful as marketed, there would not be so many attacks to prevent and 
people to arrest.  
Religious Policy 
 
The Moroccan Religious Preventing Violent Extremism (MRPVE) program is a 
continuance of a mid-1980s policy based on faith-based diplomacy. This policy has been 
upgraded and “functions through a number of sophisticated institutional mechanisms regulated 
by bilateral agreements and detailed provisions” with the Imam Training Program as a prominent 
example (Hmimnat, 2018, p. 7). For King Mohammed VI, the religious initiatives are a vital 
component of his interests and the transnational religious policies provide an influential ‘soft 
power’ (Hmimnat, 2018).  
The Casablanca attacks “destroyed the illusion that the Moroccan monarchy's grounding 
in Islam protects it from Islamic extremism and terrorism” so the state had to create a version of 
Islam that could combat them (Maghraoui, 2008). Their counterterrorism strategy is built “upon 
an inclusive, offensive counter-ideological approach which focuses on winning ‘hearts and 
minds’ through fostering and spreading moderate understanding of Islam…both inside and 
outside the country” (Hmimnat, 2018, p. 9). This entailed creating and promoting one ‘Moroccan 
Islam’. The Moroccan religious narrative adheres to Sunni Islam and the Maliki school of 
thought, with Sufism at the core being used to create a regime monopoly on national religious 
identity (Daadaoui, 2016). Sufism is defined as the mystical, spiritual dimension of Islam that 
interests itself in defeating the evil inclinations of the inner soul such as selfishness, materialism, 
and egotism (Rddad, 2020). The MRPVE strategies serve to preserve this religious identity, but 
also stem “from the state’s vision of the necessity to strengthen the Commandership of the 
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Faithful’s religious legitimacy” (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 39). By promoting Moroccan Islam as the 
best Islam to promote moderation and counter extremism, the king is homogenizing religious 
identity and strengthening his religious legitimacy inside and outside of Morocco. 
With the official Moroccan Islam comes intensive religious supervision of society. The 
Ministry of Religious Affairs oversees this by placing mosques and preaching sites under tight 
state control, and by providing services and equipment (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 40). In maintaining 
this supervision, the state has monopolized credentials to acquire religious authority through 
institutionalizing the issuance of fatwa, the training of imams and mourshidat, and the revision of 
religious programs in schools (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 40). On top of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, the Ulama Council and the Mohammedian Rabita of Religious Scholars work to promote 
the state’s message. The Mohammedian Rabita engages in de-radicalization and immunization 
efforts through an intellectual engagement with extremist ideas in academia, the media, and 
online (Hmimnat, 2019, pp. 40-41). They identify areas vulnerable to violent extremism, create 
safe religious content, and develop counter-extremism narratives that dismantle jihadist 
ideologies and immunize society against their rhetoric (Hmimnat, 2019, pp. 40-41). In addition 
to dismantling jihadist ideologies, the regime uses their official Islam to discredit popular 
protests, especially in the post-2011 climate (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 42). The MRPVE has the 
advantage that it “stems from a realistic, inclusive approach substantively different from the 
security-or the extreme laic-based approach which have proved…short and inefficient to fight 
against religious extremism in a number of MENA countries” (Hmimnat, 2018, p. 9). However, 
the policy also has many disadvantages, and has not been used solely to fight religious 
extremism but to achieve political goals and marginalize opponents of the state as well.   
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 The MRPVE program faces many deficiencies such as the ideological vision framing it, 
the instrumentalization of it to serve certain political interests, the uncertain efficacy in 
functioning, and the scope of action (Hmimnat, 2019). “Apart the bold initiatives undertaken by 
Arrabita, the other religious institutions do not reach or may not have the appropriate tools to 
deal with sensitive spaces and hot spots where Jihadists groups manage to disseminate violent 
ideas and recruit potential extremists” (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 43). Hmimnat also points out that “a 
significant part of official religious discourse is still immersed in traditional advocacy and 
religious guidance, which remains less influential and less interesting, either in form or in 
content, to the current generation of young people” and that “official religious discourse and all 
state-sponsored initiatives in general are regarded cautiously by the populace for lacking 
credibility” (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 43). Also, “religious institutions lack the internal tools and 
indicators to measure their effectiveness and capacity to reach the desired results” thereby 
rendering them unable to determine if their methodologies are successful (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 
43). Because they cannot determine this, they are then unable to identify faults and create change 
in the program to increase its efficacy. 
 The MRPVE remains a largely fragmented effort that creates a balance between religious 
actors so that none can pose a threat to the regime itself (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 43). “This lack of 
coordination, however, weakens the strength of MRPVE and challenges its effectiveness in the 
field” (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 43). Hmimnat recommends that an intergovernmental body be created 
to synergize the fragmented activities of this policy. This organization would then be able to 
develop indicators to determine their impact and present credible data to assess it. While 
organizing the religious-based efforts could help to immunize against extremism in the long-
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term, in the short-term it is difficult to distinguish how effective the religious strategy is due to 
the high vigilance and intelligence work of Moroccan security services (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 41).  
The Imam Training Program 
 
 In a 2008 speech King Mohammed VI described the ulama as the ‘conscience of the 
nation’ as they are the ones on the front lines of the war on terror interacting Moroccans daily 
(El-Katiri, 2012, p. 58). As such, in 2015, as part of the religion-based strategies to counter 
violent extremism, the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Mourchidin, and 
Murchidate was founded. This institution, located in Rabat, plays a pivotal role in the MRPVE 
strategies and distinguishes Morocco as a regional religious leader.  
Mohammed VI School for the Training of Imams 
 
 The training institute is an advanced and comprehensive facility that cost 200 million 
MAD and took 9 months to build (Chaoui, 2017). It is comprised of a mosque, classrooms, 
amphitheaters, a library, computer rooms, multipurpose rooms, a restaurant and residence 
complex, and a social and sporting complex (Habous, 2015).   
Admission 
 
 The original training program began in 2004 with 150 men and 50 women, and upon the 
opening of the Mohammed VI School in 2015 these numbers were expanded to “150 [Moroccan] 
preacher Imams and 100 [Moroccan] preachers (Morchidate) trained each year” (Habous, 2015). 
After the king’s visit to Mali in 2013, the program was opened up to international students which 
further separated Morocco as a religious leader in the region and grew the program to over 1,200 
students (Chaoui, 2017). The training school welcomes a multitude of international students, as 
of 2017 data, from these nations in this percentage breakdown: 16% Morocco, 23% Guinee, 22% 
Mali, 21% Ivory Coast, 5% Niger, and 2% Tunisia (Hmimnat, 2018). 
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 It is important to note that this training program is state-sponsored and highly selective. 
After the announcement was made, “more than 3,500 candidates submit their applications. The 
conditions are strict: menu of a license, having learned the Koran by heart, women 30 hizb, and 
being under 45 years of age. These candidates are distributed according to the grades obtained at 
the university” (Chaoui, 2017). From this pool, the 150 students are selected. “The idea is to 
tighten the recruitment criteria, with the creation of a body of imams who were to preach the 
good word across the country and also supervise their colleagues” in order to ensure the support 
and spread of the official Moroccan Islam (Chaoui, 2017). Students do not appear to be selected 
who are predisposed to non-Sufi based forms of Islam, thereby ensuring that only the students 
who are most amenable to the king’s religious message will be selected. As an example, in the 
original Malian group 95% of the imams selected were Sufis and 70% Tidjanis, and it is believed 
that those from Salafi backgrounds were not pushed forwards over those with Sufi backgrounds 
(Hmimnat, 2018, p. 25). The admission system aims to preserve the values of Moroccan Islam, 
moderation and tolerance, and to protect them against extremism.  
Curriculum  
 
 The curriculum at the Mohammed VI School for the Training of Imams aims to give its 
students a diverse and comprehensive education so that they have the necessary tools to lead 
their communities with the values of Moroccan Islam. The curriculum length differs for 
Moroccan, sub-Saharan African, and French students – one, two and three years respectively – as 
foreign students need to “‘unwind’ the bad religious training the students received throughout 
their careers as imams, making them stronger opponents of ISIS, as the group often relies on 
recruits’ limited knowledge of Islamic tenets” (Global Risk Insights, 2016). The topic areas of 
the curriculum are expansive and mark a shift from pre-Casablanca bombing times which were 
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comprised of a more traditional than modern education. According to the Ministry of Habous 
and Islamic Affairs (2015), the students are given both theoretical and practical training. The 
theoretical training includes sharia, Arabic language, foreign languages, psychology, and 
computer science. The practical training includes manuals of research and preparation, public 
speaking, physical education, and methods of communicating and convincing. According to 
Fadoua Hassani Alaoui, an IT teacher at the institute, imams are trained to master the internet so 
that they can contact other users and alert them if they are doing illegal things (TRT World, 
2017). They are also given training in mechanics, agriculture, tailoring, and IT to increase the 
chance of them receiving jobs upon their return home (TRT World, 2017). According to Chaoui 
(2017), the modules and curriculum are routinely updated to reflect changes in society, making 
the Mohammed VI School one that caters to the modern challenges it faces instead of being 
stuck in traditional ways. However, the instructors mainly come from the Councils of Ulemas, a 
state institution, and are “paid up to 300 MAD an hour” (Chaoui, 2017). The facilities, the 
admissions, and the curriculum are developed and run by the state, thereby spreading a 
homogenized version of Islam that carries political power throughout Morocco, sub-Saharan 
Africa, and beyond.  
Stipend  
 
 In addition to the instructors’ pay, imams are also highly incentivized to preach the king’s 
religious and political messages. While students, they receive a scholarship of 2,000 MAD per 
month (Chaoui, 2017). After graduation, they become government employees and “[g]raduates 
of both sexes among Moroccans receive a salary equal to that received by an assistant 
administrator of public administration, in addition to health coverage and the right to promotion” 
(Foundation Muhammad VI, 2015).  
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Placement After Graduation 
 
 In order to graduate, students must be evaluated by two subcommittees with the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, one for the Quran and the other for social sciences. According to 
Foundation Mohammed VI (2015), 2,100 Moroccan imam instructors, 900 Moroccan instructors, 
and 1,534 foreign students have graduated from the training program thus far. Then, each 
“qualified imam instructor is assigned to a territorial district where there is a Local Council of 
[U]lema and a Delegation from the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs” (Foundation 
Muhammad VI, 2015). The imams work in mosques and supervise the religious requirements of 
the citizens, and the mourshidat run literacy programs for women, direct after school programs in 
mosques, and council single mothers, prisoners, and hospital patients (Errihani, 2011). 
According to Rddad, after 2003 much more importance was given to female religious guides 
(Sadik Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 2020). They were given both a religious and 
secular education like the male imams, and then appointed throughout the country to both rural 
and urban shanty towns. It was important to capitalize on women because women find mosques 
to be exclusively for men, so the mourshidat gives someone for women to go to for guidance and 
a religious education (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 2020). Women are the first 
teachers of their children, and if they are taught the state’s moderate Islam then they can spread 
it, and according to Rddad, prevent the susceptibility to radicalization of both mothers and their 
children (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 2020). Outreach and “knowledge of 
local realities and customs” are highly important for both male and female graduates as they aim 
to influence the hearts and minds of their jurisdictions to guide not only their religious lives, but 
personal and political ones too (El-Katiri, 2012, p. 65).  




 Students and scholars seek to promote moderate Islam and disavow extremist ideas in 
their nations. The Mohammed VI Institute is an important facet of the strategy to immunize these 
countries against extremist ideologies as these students will become “enlightened religious 
leaders” in their respective communities (Hmimnat, 2018, p. 23). In an interview with TRT 
World (2017), a Turkish broadcast service, Abdesselam Lazaar from the Mohammed VI Institute 
says that: “The role of the institute is to correct the wide interpretations used by terrorists to 
justify concepts such as loyalty and disavow sharia, Salafism, and jihad. These concepts have 
been disfigured and misused”. Because of this disfiguration, Aboubakr Thani Sylla, a Guinean 
student, says his mission is difficult because “correcting conceptions is not an easy task” and 
“you need a lot of things to change peoples’ behavior” (TRT World, 2017). Youssef Belal, an 
anthropologist of religion, challenges these misconceptions and misuses of Islamic terms and 
says that jihad is about a commitment to do good. The institute encourages the contextualization 
of Islam in opposition to the extremists who decontextualize Islam to promote their aberrant 
version of jihad. It encourages pluri-disciplinarity that takes Imams away from the simplistic, 
literal reading of Islam (French 24, 2017). Mohamed El Ouassi, a French student of Moroccan 
origin, supports Belal’s ideas by saying that terrorism is stealing the Islamic religion via ideology 
and needs to be countered by ideas taught in their training (French 24, 2017). These individuals 
believe in the mission of the institute and many, like Hind Usman, a young woman from Nigeria, 
have left their homes to study Islam in Morocco so that they could affect lasting, peaceful change 
upon the completion of their studies (Bouknight, 2019). These students find the institute to be 
key in fighting against Islamist ideologies, and to be giving them the tools and advanced 
knowledge to do so in their own communities.  




 An important way in which Morocco’s religious leaders influence the hearts and minds of 
their followers is through the Friday sermon. The Friday sermon is one of the most important 
rituals in Islam and its contents have drastically changed since government intervention began in 
2003, resulting in effects on both religion and politics (Errihani, 2011). Before the attacks, 
“radical imams in Moroccan mosques were free to preach their gospel because their rhetoric was 
seen as ‘empty’ by the state” (Errihani, 2011). Afterwards, the Friday sermon became an 
important target in preventing violent extremism strategies and the Mohammed VI School for the 
Training of Imams was the boldest step taken to counter Islamist discourse in it (Errihani, 2011). 
According to Errihani (2011), there are three types of sermons in Morocco: moderate, militant, 
and state sponsored. Moderate sermons are the least common and least controversial as they are 
grounded less in politics and more in moderate religious discourse. They promote salvation 
through moral conduct and fear of God and shun direct criticism of the state and its institutions. 
Militant sermons strongly connect religion and politics. They condemn foreign intervention in 
the Muslim way of life, denounce Arab leaders for betraying them, and call for a return to a more 
authentic Islam. These sermons rely on the imam’s ability to interpret Islamic texts in a way that 
corroborates a purely Islamist agenda and work to turn people against the state. State sponsored 
sermons are those promoted by the monarch and his religious institutions. These sermons are 
given to imams by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs or are pre-approved by the ministry if written 
by the imam. Their messages praise the regime and stress Islam’s call for obedience to the 
umma’s leader, the Moroccan king and Commander of the Faithful.    
Importance 
 
 Presently, most Islamic states believe that this sermon should only convey religious 
messages, however, religion and politics have been inextricably linked throughout history 
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(Errihani, 2011). For example, the Prophet Mohammed was also a statesman, and therefore 
moral and socio-political content were intertwined in his messages (Errihani, 2011). The Friday 
sermon is “delivered by a symbolic power figure, both political and social, who speaks on behalf 
of the congregation using the uncontestable sources on which the Muslim faith is based (the 
Qur'an, Hadith and Sunnah),” and no one dares question this authority (Errihani, 2011). The 
imam is considered an authority who must be obeyed; however, he is not only conveying 
religious teachings. The sermons have been “a useful public forum for channeling religious, 
political and social announcements that impacts on the way members of the congregation 
conduct themselves on a day-to-day basis” and aim to “reform through persuasion that 
eventually leads to action” (Errihani, 2011). In 2011, imams were given a sermon to promote a 
‘yes’ vote on the constitutional referendum (Belghazi, 2020). The new imam is expected to 
uphold and promote government policy and condemn religious influences that differ from the 
official narrative of Moroccan Islam.  
 Morocco has a population of about 34.3 million and more than 99% of that population 
identifies as Sunni Muslim; religiosity has only increased since the state’s independence in 1956 
(State Department, 2018; El-Katiri, 2012, p. 55). In a 2011 survey of Moroccans 88.9% of 
respondents indicated that religion is ‘very important’ in their life (World Survey, 2011). In that 
same survey, when asked how much faith they have in imams and given the options ‘a great 
deal’, ‘quite a lot’, ‘not very much’, ‘none at all’, ‘no answer’, and ‘don't know’, 65.5% said ‘a 
great deal’ and 24.7% said ‘quite a lot’ (World Survey, 2011). However, when given those same 
options and asked how much confidence they have in the government, 19.6% said ‘a great deal’, 
24.8% said ‘quite a lot’, 31.7% ‘not very much’, and 17% ‘none at all’. This data is important in 
that it shows a high Sunni Muslim population, high confidence in imams, and low confidence in 
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the government. While there is ‘not very much’ confidence in the government, the government is 
able to wield political influence through the state-run training of imams. A large majority of 
Moroccan’s have ‘a great deal’ of faith in imams, and by placing their faith in their imams the 
Moroccan people are unknowingly placing their faith in the homogenized religious and political 
messages of the king, thereby ensuring loyalty to the state in all reaches of the nation.  
The Efficacy of the Imam Training Program in Preventing Violent Extremism 
 While Morocco’s religious reforms following the 2003 Casablanca Bombings have 
served as a political tool to consolidate the Commander of the Faithful’s power, El-Katiri (2012) 
argues that they are not simply a charade. The reforms are “arguably one of the most 
comprehensive reform packages of religion and religious institutions in Morocco, or indeed other 
Muslim countries, have yet experienced” (El-Katiri, 2012, p. 54). However, while these reforms, 
specifically the founding of the Mohammed VI School for the Training of Imams, may succeed 
in limiting Salafist preaching and promoting moderate Islam, there is no cohesion of the overall 
strategy. Given that it does not have the necessary resources, its tasks are “vast and probably 
impossible to achieve in the foreseeable future” (El-Katiri, 2012, p. 67). Also, there is no data to 
determine if succeeding in these goals results in achieving the larger goal of preventing violent 
extremism. Boulter finds that intelligence and security methods will be most effective in 
reducing “the appeal of Morocco as a base for IS operations” supporting the point that the Imam 
Training Program’s promotion of a moderate Islam is not most effective. Before 2003 Morocco 
had said that they do not have a problem with religious extremism because they have moderate 
Islam. If moderate Islam was really the antidote to extremism, then Morocco would not have 
extremism (Driss Maghraoui, personal communication, May 9, 2020). Maghraoui stated that 
imams can play a role in reforming religion but does not think that reforming religion will result 
in less religious extremism as extremism will find ways around the new barriers (Driss 
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Maghraoui, personal communication, May 9, 2020). The religious-based policies are not solely a 
political tool, but they are more effective in limiting religious pluralism and increasing the power 
of the king than preventing violent extremism.  
Prevention of Salafist Preaching  
 “Containing radical discourse in the mosque in an attempt to preserve political order 
became a priority for the Moroccan state on the eve of the May 2003 Casablanca attacks. Prior to 
this date, Islamist imams enjoyed the status of rock stars in their mosques” (Lamlili, 2007). The 
Islamist imams’ messages were viewed as nonthreatening, however immediately following the 
attacks the state fired all non-authorized imams and silenced opposing voices so the they could 
take charge of religion (Errihani, 2011). Through rigorous state control of Islamic institutions 
and education, Salafist preaching has been kept out of the mosques and replaced with state-
sponsored ideas. These extremist messages have been eliminated from all forms of education as 
well. Global Risk Insights (2016) identified that extremist groups like ISIS recruited youth 
through “the use of independent extremist preachers,” so by reforming education in schools and 
in the mosque the state works to eliminate this threat.  
 The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs monitors religious education and all 
dissemination of Islamic materials (State Department, 2018). Included in this policy, the ministry 
monitors the imams and the female religious leaders. “According to media reports…the 
government requested regional MEIA representatives identify and monitor imams (morchidines) 
and female Muslim spiritual guides (morchidates) who have accounts on social media to ensure 
only official religious positions were conveyed through these personal accounts” (State 
Department, 2018). These morchidines and morchidates are trained by the Mohammed VI 
School, whose curriculum teaches the proper messages to convey and use of media. While the 
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government said they did not interfere with the chosen topics for sermons, the religious leaders 
were required to abide by MEIA-issued guidelines in the Guide of the Imam, Khatib, and the 
Preacher (State Department, 2018). Quranic schools were also monitored to prevent extremist 
rhetoric and ensure teaching follows the approved doctrines. In order to do this, “[t]he 
government required mosques to close to the public shortly after daily prayer times to prevent 
use of the premises for what it termed “unauthorized activity,” including gatherings intended to 
promote extremism” (State Department, 2018). If new mosques were to be constructed in 
Morocco, they would require approval from the MEIA to ensure their adherence to state policies 
and official Moroccan Islam. In primary, junior, and high schools, the Ministry of Education and 
the MEIA introduced thirteen new textbooks on religion and legal sciences to “remove extremist 
or intolerant references and promote moderation and tolerance” (State Department, 2018). The 
monitoring of content in sermons, Islamic religious education, and the dissemination of Islamic 
material by media are claimed to be for the purpose of combatting violent extremism. Errihani 
(2011) argues that the state has been successful in curbing extremist discourse in the mosque 
through these efforts, which include the Imam Training School, religious broadcasts, and more.  
 However, it is important to note that religious reform in education and the mosques has 
not worked towards eliminating extremism on its own. According to Hmimnat (2018), NGOs 
play a large part in this battle. NGOs, like the Maghreb Scholars League and the Africa Centrism 
Forum, work to disseminate moderate Islamic through from below. The Moroccan MUR is 
known for “being active in confronting extremist thoughts in fragile areas such as Sidi Moumen 
neighborhood where the 2003 Casablanca bombings’ suiciders came from” (Hmimnat, 2018, p. 
20). Because these NGOs have intimate knowledge of the vulnerable communities they work to 
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affect, they are able to have a strong positive impact on the fight against extremism in Morocco 
showing that you cannot rely solely on the efforts of the ulema to be successful in this mission.  
Strengthening the Power of the Commander of the Faithful 
 Morocco’s powerful and leading religious reforms to combat violent extremism also 
work to strengthen the power of the Commander of the Faithful, a religious status codified by 
King Hassan II in the 1962 constitution (Sheline, 2019, p. 3). The Moroccan constitution states 
that Islam is the religion of the state, guarantees the freedom to practice religious affairs, and 
names the king Commander of the Faithful (State Department, 2018). While the 2011 Arab 
Spring protests resulted in a new constitution, it did not do away with the centrality of the 
monarchy in the Moroccan political system (Driss Maghraoui, personal communication, May 9, 
2020). And, according to the constitution, the king, who claims descendance from the Prophet, is 
the only political institution allowed to combine both political and religious power (El-Katiri, 
2012, p. 55). Islam and politics are inherently intertwined from the top down.  
 The Moroccan king acts as a central top-down state actor who defines what is 
implemented by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, and any other institution that concerns religious 
reforms. The High Council of Ulema, a “group headed and appointed by the king with 
representatives from all regions of the country,” is “authorized to issue fatwas, which become 
legally binding only through the king’s endorsement in a royal decree and subsequent 
confirmation by parliamentary legislation. If the king or parliament decline to ratify a decision of 
the Ulema, the decision remains nonbinding and unenforced” (State Department, 2018). Thus, 
changes in religion cannot be made without the approval of the monarch. Also, the king’s power 
allows him to suppress rivals. For example, there are two main Islamist parties in Morocco, the 
PJD and Justice and Charity. The PJD supports the king as Commander of the Faithful while 
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Justice and Charity is anti-state and has been banned (Lefevre, 2013). By only legalizing the 
functions of those who support him, the king is allowed to evade criticism and promote his own 
political and religious policies.  
 Because of the preeminence of Morocco’s religious reforms and international reach of the 
Mohammed VI Training School, the king has gained a lot of respect and power outside the 
nation as well. This is especially notable in other Muslim West African nations, especially ones 
belonging to Sufi orders.  
Sufism is one of the common denominators that bind Morocco, historically and 
culturally, with a number of sub-Saharan African countries. The Kingdom has been for a 
long-time a pivotal hub for many Sufi orders, such as Tidjania, Qadiriya, Darqawiya, 
Shazilia and others, providing an entrance through which Islam spread and expanded into 
Western and Eastern Africa. (Hmimnat, 2018, p. 15) 
Hmimnat notes that King Mohammed VI makes frequent and prolonged visits to African nations, 
making direct contact between the leader of the umma and a mass of followers (Hmimnat, 2018). 
The monarchy has sent a considerable amount of resources into the Western Sahara and sub-
Saharan Africa, regions in which they want to gain influence (Andrew R. Smith, personal 
communication, May 11, 2020). Through “outreach to secular countries like Senegal and Mali 
that cannot legally regulate religion, yet wish to discourage the spread of extremism,” the king 
reinforces his religious leadership in the region (Sheline, 2019, p. 6). In Senegal, people 
“whatever their status, take the royal visit to their country as a personal matter. Their reception of 
the monarch is first and foremost a reception of the Commander of the Faithful…they prostrate 
on his passage as though they are performing the pledge of allegiance to him” (Hmimnat, 2018, 
p. 13). The Ministry of Islamic Affairs builds mosques, donates copies of the Quran, and 
provides Islamic publications. According to Hmimnat (2018), since 2014 the king has donated 
about 10,000 copies of the Quran, edited by the Mohammed VI Foundation, to each country he 
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has visited. In these nations the king holds public Friday prayers where he stresses the values of 
tolerance, moderation, and common identity. King Mohammed VI spreads Moroccan Islam and 
increases his own legitimacy not only by educating foreign imams, but also by traveling to these 
nations and preaching these messages himself. The religious goal is to promote moderation and 
prevent violent extremism, but the political goal on top is to strengthen the authority of the king 
as Commander of the Faithful.  
 The Moroccan model of spiritual based security has grown in favor over those of Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, and Tunisia and its influence has reached outside of sub-Saharan Africa 
(Hmimnat, 2018). Morocco has become a key leader in the international community and its 
strategy “encouraged…precisely because its compatibility, inclusiveness, and solubility into the 
ongoing peacebuilding and counter-terrorism initiatives in the region” (Hmimnat, 2018, p. 10). 
At a 2018 Armistice Day celebration in France, King Mohammed VI sat in the front row with the 
heads of state of France, Germany, Russia, Canada, Israel, and the United States, representing 
the king’s international standing. “Mohammed VI has developed partnerships with the EU and 
the U.S., particularly on the issues of combatting terrorism and preventing migrants from 
crossing into Europe from North Africa” (Sheline, 2019, p. 3). “The United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 2178 (2014) states the importance of strengthening the roles of religious 
leaders to counter violent extremism, and on September 30, 2014 Morocco attended a UN 
Counterterrorism Committee event (Hmimnat, 2018). This event was entitled ‘Countering 
Incitement to Commit Terrorist Acts Motivated by Extremism and Intolerance: The Kingdom of 
Morocco’s Approach and Experiences of other African States’. The United Nations Counter-
Terrorism Executive Directorate noted the Imams Training Program as a best practice and stated 
that religious institutions play a pivotal role “in creating a sound environment for dialogue and 
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coexistence within the community, and effectively prevent any abuse of religion to justify or 
incite terrorist acts” (Hmimnat, 2018, p. 3). The United Nations, one of the foremost 
international authorities, presented Morocco’s strategies as preeminent thereby justifying and 
validating the efforts that create the program regardless of there not being data to support its 
success or that it may result in limiting religious pluralism or undue power to the monarch. This 
elevates the goal of preventing terrorism over the potential faults and drawbacks with the 
program itself. These events gave the king greater international respect and influence and did not 
provide motivation to genuinely monitor the effects of the program on the Moroccan population. 
 The king’s increased international praise for the PVE program is a result of an image 
projected not of an on-the-ground reality. The religious and security measures in the PVE 
program are supposed to compliment one another, but according to Smith, it is a carrot and stick 
situation with the makhzen leading the way as the omnipresent stick (Andrew R. Smith, personal 
communication, May 11, 2020). The stick forces you to change your attitude, beliefs, and 
interpretation of religious texts or undergo negative conditions or treatment (Andrew R. Smith, 
personal communication, May 11, 2020). The rhetoric promoted is of national unity, but in order 
to limit opposition the strategy is to divide and conquer. To maintain control over a unified 
nation, the king has to create disunity among his enemies. Instead of using violence like his 
father, Hassan II, Mohammed VI uses symbolic methods to subdue opposition. For example, a 
journalist who was covering the protests in the Rif had her sex life exposed; instead of 
threatening the opposer with violence the king threatens them with an unrelated and largely 
symbolic legal action (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 2020). On the other 
hand, opposition that changes their ideology and gives fealty to king is rewarded. Half of the 
commission that managed the revision of the constitution in 2011 was composed of former 
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militants and radicals from the 1970s and 1980s, and the PJD was sanctioned as a political party 
and won seats in Parliament despite being Islamist (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, 
May 11, 2020). Smith is skeptical of the PVE program as it theoretically may have merits, but in 
administration the security programs are in charge and people under a stick will lie about their 
true beliefs to protect themselves (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 2020). 
You do not change peoples’ beliefs by putting a stick over their heads. This program has political 
goals to silence opposition and marginalize religious actors that threaten to delegitimize the 
Commander of the Faithful.  
The Limiting of Religious Pluralism 
 In developing and enforcing their religion-based preventing violent extremism program, 
with a key facet being the Imam Training Program, “Morocco might be unconsciously adopting 
the same mantra as ISIS and company: that subscribing to their particular interpretation and 
worldview is the only true way to be a Muslim” (Global Risk Insights, 2016). By promoting 
Moroccan Islam as the only correct version of a complex religion, the state is limiting religious 
pluralism, which has a reducing effect on diversity and culture and a growing effect on the king’s 
political and religious power. 
 Islam and the rights of religious minorities are not contradictory nor incompatible, 
however, one of the major challenges facing the Muslim world today is “how to accommodate 
contemporary human rights principles within an Islamic worldview and without falling into a 
false choice between traditionalist approaches to sharia and liberal alternatives drawn from 
secular discourse” (Iharchane and Maghraoui, 2017, p. 33). For conservative reactionary 
communities, they think that what is is good, that they need to resist change, and that they have 
to combat anything that does not look like them (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 
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2020). During the constitutional debates in 2011 religious scholars, such as Ahmad Raissouni, 
“argued that including freedom of religion in the new constitution would threaten the Islamic 
identity of the state and the principle of the “commander of the faithful” as the cornerstone of the 
Moroccan political system” (Iharchane and Maghraoui, 2017, p. 37). However, modern ideas of 
human rights and religious freedoms are not incompatible with an Islamic identity. In fact, to 
promote freedom of religion, the Islamic texts should be rethought to synchronize local meanings 
and practices with universal ideas (Iharchane and Maghraoui, 2017, p. 33).  
 International human rights law is a key feature in this debate. The 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political rights 
contained specific and fundamental references to freedom of religion and the rights of religious 
minorities (Iharchane and Maghraoui, 2017, p. 33). These texts 
agree on the right to choose one’s beliefs, as well as the right to change them. They insist 
on freedom of worship and the right to publicly express one’s beliefs, they reject any 
form of discrimination on the basis of religion, and they prohibit the advocacy of 
religious hatred. The provisions insist that individuals should not be compelled to profess 
a belief. (Iharchane and Maghraoui, 2017, p. 34) 
However, it is important to note that there are exceptions to the principle of belief in the 
international agreements such as permitting national laws to be restrictive factors. It is 
permissible “to restrict freedom of belief when public order and safety are at risk, or when this 
right interferes with public values or with the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” 
(Iharchane and Maghraoui, 2017, p. 34). Also, the Moroccan constitution “does not establish the 
supremacy of international treaties over domestic law, which means that the protection of human 
rights including the freedom of worship is not guaranteed” (Iharchane and Maghraoui, 2017, p. 
38). The exceptions and ambiguity in the language of these texts allow their interpretation to be 
up to each individual country. In Morocco, one could argue that public order and safety have 
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been at risk since the 2003 Casablanca Bombings, and that in order to protect the nation the 
monarchy needs to promote unity and public values through Moroccan Islam and the Religious 
PVE program. Language meant to promote religious freedoms may actually be used to justify the 
restriction of it.  
 The state’s message promotes that the only way to be Moroccan is to be Sunni Muslim, 
and to be anything else excludes you from state acceptance. In one of the king’s last speeches, he 
made it clear that his title of Commander of the Faithful includes everyone, not just Muslims, 
and, according to Maghraoui, this may be a small sign of openness towards religious minorities 
(Driss Maghraoui, personal communication, May 9, 2020). However, Maghraoui also stated that 
the rights of religious minorities have to be secured through a legal process that protects them 
which is not really there yet (Driss Maghraoui, personal communication, May 9, 2020). The 
policy of spiritual security is supposed to protect the state, but if it is meant to deprive people of 
certain rights then it becomes problematic.  
 The Moroccan constitution says people are free to practice their religious affairs, but the 
king is the Commander of the Faithful and the protector of Islam, and prohibits any criticism of 
Islam (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 2020). In fact, the constitution 
“prohibits political parties founded on religion and political parties, parliamentarians, and 
constitutional amendments that denigrate or infringe on Islam” (State Department, 2018). And, 
Moroccan law “penalizes the use of enticements to convert a Muslim to another religion and 
prohibits criticism of Islam” (State Department, 2018). People are also not given the right to 
change their religion and this has been a major problem (Driss Maghraoui, personal 
communication, May 9, 2020). “Most traditionalist scholars agree on the principle that once a 
person becomes a Muslim, he or she is not allowed to change religion. They argue that apostasy 
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is contrary to Islam’s communitarian principle and undermines social cohesion” (Iharchane and 
Maghraoui, 2017, p. 34). To be anything or to promote anything but Sunni Islam invites legal 
penalties and a great burden on one’s life. “According to the 2017-2018 Moroccan Association 
of Human Rights Report, the only non-Muslim citizens who could freely practice their religion 
were Jews. While Jews have historically had a special status, Shia are considered highly 
suspicious, the Baha’i are banned, and Salafists are banned and subject to deradicalization 
programs (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 2020). Local Christian and Shia 
leaders reported the government detained and questioned some Christian and Shia citizens about 
their beliefs and contacts with other Christians and Shias” (State Department, 2018). A few years 
ago, the state closed high schools they believed were teaching Shia Islam (Driss Maghraoui, 
personal communication, May 9, 2020). The Moroccan government also restricts minority 
religious groups through denying formal requests and as an example, denied two citizens the 
documents needed to marry because of their Christian beliefs (State Department, 2018).  
 On June 14, 2018 the Minister of State for Human Rights Mustafa Ramid “stated in an 
interview that ‘freedom of belief does not pose a short-term threat to the state but is certainly a 
long-term danger’ to national cohesion” (State Department, 2018). From the top down, other 
religions than that which is supported by the state are repressed and made to seem like a threat. 
Despite Pew Research Center (2015) identifying approximately 20,000 Christians, less than 
10,000 Hindus, less than 10,000 Buddhists, less than 10,000 Jews, and less than 10,000 members 
of other religions as comprising Morocco’s population, on June 19, 2018 Minister of Justice 
Mohamed Aujjar “denied the existence of Christian, Baha’i, and Ahmadi citizens on national 
television, but he said throughout history, Morocco has allowed Jewish citizens and visiting 
Christians from Europe and Africa to practice their religious affairs freely” (Pew Research 
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Center, 2015; State Department, 2018). For Shias, the state wants to eliminate their influence in 
Morocco and Maghraoui sees this as a possible infringement on freedom of worship (Driss 
Maghraoui, personal communication, May 9, 2020). Anyone claiming to be a Christian has the 
potential to be stopped and harassed and any attempt to convert a Muslim to Christianity is a 
felony offense (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 2020). Ironically, the Pope 
most recently visited Morocco in 2019 under the invitation of Mohammed VI to “reinvigorate 
‘interfaith dialogue, mutual understanding between the faithful of the two religions, and the 
values of peace and tolerance’” (Bouknight, 2019). These religious minorities do exist and as 
exemplified above, are not allowed to live as freely as their Sunni counterparts. Majorities in 
collectivist cultures, like Morocco, are afraid their unity will be diluted by minorities and 
therefore create nations that are prisons of minority voices, meaning that they exist but are 
controlled and disciplined (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 2020). In promoting 
the religious strategies to prevent violent extremism, the state also promotes policies that restrict 
freedom of religion in Morocco. 
 Morocco is highly restrictive of religion, both outside and inside of Sunni Islam. While 
there are about two hundred instances in which the Quran guarantees the right to exercise 
freedom of belief, this right is not realized on the ground in Morocco (Iharchane and Maghraoui, 
2017, p. 35). According to the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Features Project (2016), for the 
indicator ‘government restriction of religion’ the median world score is 2.8/10 and Morocco is 
marked at 7.4/10. Smith finds that the government’s PVE program limits religious freedoms as it 
ensures only the state sanctioned religion has influence over the population (Andrew R. Smith, 
personal communication, May 11, 2020). Under the strategy introduced by new royal decree in 
2004, the High Council of the Ulama’s “main strategic goal is to achieve a high level of religious 
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homogeneity among Moroccan Muslims and maintain the Madhab unity in Morocco” (El-Katiri, 
2012, pp. 57-58). As mentioned, one of the state’s first actions following the Casablanca 
bombings was to close mosques they deemed not in compliance with their religious beliefs and 
then to monitor the rest. While it is beneficial to prevent the preaching of extremist ideas and this 
action achieved that, the state is also forcefully imposing official Moroccan Islam and 
prohibiting any messages that differ from being represented whether or not they promote 
violence. When asked in a 2017 survey to express their agreement with the statement:  
‘There is only one way to interpret the teachings of my religion,’ responses varied 
[among Moroccans], without a strong affirmative or negative trend: 37 percent voiced 
agreement or strong agreement; 25 percent expressed disagreement or strong 
disagreement; 20 percent selected ‘I do not know’; and 17 percent said they neither 
agreed nor disagreed. (Sheline, 2019, p. 11) 
This shows that while many Moroccans agree there is one way to interpret Islam like the king 
does, many Moroccans also disagree and find that there are multiple ways to interpret Islam 
thereby countering the king’s narrative. Outside of the mosque, the state controls and 
standardizes the curriculum in Quranic schools and traditional education, where the only religion 
taught is Moroccan Sunni Islam (El-Katiri, 2012). Rddad believes that education and religion 
should create a uniform culture and that American/Western values cannot be projected on 
Muslim/Eastern countries, however, this prevents students of all ages and circumstances from 
learning about a diverse array of religious backgrounds (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, 
May 9, 2020). By not learning of other religions and focusing on Moroccan Islam, the state is 
ensuring that each generation subscribes to their religious narrative and does not declare 
allegiance to another faith as this action would then challenge the power of the Commander of 
the Faithful.   
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 On top of preventing the rise of opposition, the Commander of the Faithful also bans it. 
There are not supposed to be political parties in Morocco that are founded on religion, but the 
PJD is an Islamist party sanctioned by the government since they show fealty to the king 
(Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 2020). At the same time, Al-Adl wa Al-
Ihssan (Justice and Charity), an Islamist movement that opposes the king as the spiritual leader, 
has been banned. The positions taken by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and the Council of the 
Ulama during the 2011 Constitution referendum and Hirak al-Rif (2016) indicate how the 
“Moroccan regime uses official Islam to discredit popular protests and take control” (Hmimnat, 
2019, p. 42). The Imam Training Program supports the idea of official Islam being used as a 
political tool as it enforces that Moroccan Islam is the correct Islam to both domestic and 
international audiences. As students from Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa graduate from this 
program, they return back to their communities and promote the homogenized state Islam and 
could potentially be curbing religious diversity in their communities.  
 There is a vast difference between the rhetoric of tolerance and pluralism, and the reality 
that there can be no threat to Islam as defined by the monarchy (Andrew R. Smith, personal 
communication, May 11, 2020). Morocco is a state of paradoxes. The state is aiming to create 
cohesion, but at the same time they are marginalizing and alienating minority religious groups. 
Until the state begins to protect the rights of all peoples, they will not achieve true cohesion and 
will remain at risk to the factors that contribute to violent extremism. While it is positive that the 
Imam Training Program and the broader religious preventing violent extremism program are 
promoting peace, moderation, and unity, the limiting of religious pluralism and expansion of the 
monarch’s power can have lasting negative effects. These effects could include falsely claiming 
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to be immunizing the nation and the surrounding region against violent extremism while not 
attacking more probable causes. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 There were three types of measures enacted following the 2003 Casablanca Bombings: 
immediate, short-term, and long-term (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 2020). 
The immediate measures were the crackdowns against perpetrators, and the short and long-term 
measures were the reforms of the religious field. Reforming the religious field entailed placing 
mosques under direct supervision of the state and substituting a pro-Saudi Secretary of Islamic 
Affairs with a Sufi adept. The goal was to use moderate Islam to change the rhetoric from hatred 
of non-Muslims, a fundamentalist value, to love of every creature, a Sufi value. It also worked to 
change the notion of jihad from an extreme jihad that perpetuates attacks against non-Muslims, 
to a Sufi jihad that emphasizes the internal struggle against materialism and egoism. The state 
promoted the image of Moroccan Islam with four cornerstones: Ash’ari, Maliki, Sunni Islam, 
and the king as Commander of the Faithful, and Rddad believes these are important because they 
help immunize Morocco from external influences like Shia Iran. Smith points out that contrary to 
the Maturidi school, which is rationalist and believes god exists within a frame of human reason, 
the Ash’ari school says human reason is unstable and subordinate to the Quran and Sunna, and 
that too much interpretation is the problem (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 
2020). He also believes that taking control of the mosques was a way to immunize against rural 
imams preaching fundamentalist ideas and recruiting for extremist organizations. The king is 
responsible for the protection of moderate Islam against internal and external radicalization and 
no one can issue a fatwa or teach anything that goes against the characteristics of moderate Islam 
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he has prescribed (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 2020). The way Rddad 
described these matters made them seem beneficial and productive in achieving their goals.  
 However, Andrew R. Smith attributes these policies more to image than to effectively 
immunizing against fundamentalists (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 
2020). He says that from 1999, when King Mohammed VI ascended to the throne, until 2003, the 
year of the Casablanca Bombings, the king’s policies had opened up discourse and increased 
freedom of speech and of the press. Following the bombings, the monarchy issued severe 
crackdowns where the Makhzen rounded up many Islamists and anyone they deemed suspicious, 
with or without evidence, and forced confessions through torture or by threatening families. At 
the same time, the monarchy was promoting an image of tolerance. Where Rddad briefly 
mentions the arrests and provides a positive tone to the king’s responses following the 2003 
attacks, Smith provides details of the human rights abuses and display of power that occurred. 
According to Smith, the security approach is the reality on the ground not the religious policies. 
The monarchy is intent on sustaining a credible image of legitimacy and ensuring countries who 
are invested in Morocco, like France and the U.S., that there is a democratic transition occurring. 
The Moroccan state promotes this transition of justice movement while also brutally cracking 
down on Islamists (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 2020).  
 The Moroccan PVE program is a “questionable success story” (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 37). 
Official discourse by the state brands their strategy as ‘unique’ and shows that Morocco incurs 
the “least number of terrorist attacks compared to its neighbors” (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 37). In spite 
of this, the 2011 World Survey data shows that when asked about their worry of a terrorist 
attack, 50.1% of respondents indicated ‘very much’ or ‘a great deal’. The state does not share the 
amount of Moroccan fighters involved in international terrorist organizations, “the rise of 
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recidivism among former extremist detainees”, or “the growing number of terrorist cells 
dismantled by the Moroccan security authorities” (Hmimnat, 2019, p. 37). If there are so many 
people to be arrested, then the immunization of fundamentalism has clearly not been effective. 
However, Errihani (2011) argues that “As long as the state continues to call attention to the 
peace and stability that it has guaranteed its subjects in these uncertain times, it is expected to 
continue to count on its citizens’ support in the fight against religious extremism in Morocco”. 
As long as the state continues to project the image of stability and legitimacy, people will 
continue to give up their human rights.  
  The Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs argues that “the state’s intervention in the 
religious practices of its subjects will eventually help Moroccans return to the firm roots of 
Islamic shari’a, which are uniquely Moroccan due to the influences of Moroccan cultural 
traditions on people's religious practices” (Errihani, 2011. The ministry further argues “that a 
return to the Moroccan brand of Islam (Popular Islam) has always been the hallmark of the 
spiritual peace and stability, which have characterised Morocco throughout its long history, and 
has therefore made Morocco an exceptionally stable and peaceful country in the Arab and 
Muslim world” (Errihani, 2011). These policies fail to acknowledge religious diversity and 
suggest that only official Moroccan Islam can create peace and stability in Morocco and the 
regions the monarch is attempting to influence.  
 The monarch cannot allow various interpretations of Islam, anything against himself as 
the religious leader, or a promotion of violence; and since imams have considerable influence 
over their flock both directly and indirectly, they are a useful tool in preventing these things 
(Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 2020). You cannot deradicalize a nation 
simply by cracking down, and Rddad argues that the long-term measures effective in 
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deradicalization are education and the training of imams (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, 
May 9, 2020). In these educational programs, Rddad says all forms of rhetoric that teach hatred 
of Jews or other Muslims should be removed, and that Islam should be taught with a more liberal 
interpretation of the sacred texts that promotes peace and tolerance. After 9/11 we learned that 
terrorism has no face and no boarders, and he further argues that because of this training only 
Moroccan imams is not complete and it should extend to neighboring countries to create buffer 
zones (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 2020). Rddad argues that you cannot pass 
anti-terror acts without programs that aim at deradicalizing rhetoric, and that you need to train 
people to train others for long-term change. While the effort in fighting violent extremism may 
be multi-pronged, limiting religious pluralism in the name of creating unity will not solve these 
issues. Violent rhetoric should not be supported, of course, but specifically using religion to fight 
fundamentalism will not be entirely successful.  
 In order to make concrete, measurable progress in ‘immunizing’ against Islamic 
fundamentalism and violent extremism in Morocco, socioeconomic issues need to be addressed. 
The Imam Training Program and other aspects of the religious PVE program are not useless, but 
they are only one aspect of how to deal with extremism (Driss Maghraoui, personal 
communication, May 9, 2020). Extremism is not limited to Muslim societies, and therefore does 
not necessitate a religious approach. Social marginality breeds different type of violence, and in 
Muslim countries it could result in ISIS or Al-Qaeda and in the U.S it could result in gangs 
(Driss Maghraoui, personal communication, May 9, 2020). Rddad agrees that fundamentalism is 
not exclusive to Islam and says that it does not have to be religious; it came first in Christianity 
in the 20th century and Communists are a type of fundamentalist (Sadik Rddad, personal 
communication, May 9, 2020). He notes that fundamentalism nourishes on people who are not 
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normal and the same, but many people think that what is normal is natural whereas what is 
normal is humanmade (Sadik Rddad, personal communication, May 9, 2020). By dealing with 
security or religious field reforms you are only dealing with artificial components and incorrectly 
assuming the source of extremism is religion (Driss Maghraoui, personal communication, May 9, 
2020). Extremism is not inherently Islamic or Muslim and certain inequalities do not breed 
certain problems; extremism is an outcome of social marginalization no matter the location 
(Driss Maghraoui, personal communication, May 9, 2020). 
 Extremism is the result of long-term structural problems in any given society, and if you 
want to deal with extremism, you need to deal with structural issues such as social inequality and 
economic disparities, and push forward a democratic order (Driss Maghraoui, personal 
communication, May 9, 2020). The structural issues are not in the security and religious fields; 
there are more fundamental causes. While Rddad believes that you need to combat 
fundamentalism using dissemination of rhetoric, training of young people, and training of 
imams, this, while it may be helpful in spreading the values of moderate Islam to subsequent 
generations, will not work to ‘immunize’ against the causes of extremism (Sadik Rddad, 
personal communication, May 9, 2020). Many young people live in hopeless poverty situations 
in Morocco and if you do not address the underlying socioeconomic conditions you will not 
succeed in this goal (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, May 11, 2020). According to 
Smith, Morocco was one of the first African nations to transfer public wealth into private hands, 
and these private hands are often close to the king. Moroccans have to pay for things they should 
get for free, government funding for public education was given to private, public school 
teachers often have to work multiple jobs, and the Unemployed Graduates Movement is one of 
the largest, ongoing Moroccan protest movements (Andrew R. Smith, personal communication, 
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May 11, 2020). What is need is economic self-sufficiency and literacy development to give 
opportunities and hope, and instead there is an overwhelming sense of intimidation (Andrew R. 
Smith, personal communication, May 11, 2020).  
Conclusion 
 The Imam Training Program, an important feature of the Moroccan Religious Preventing 
Violent Extremism Program, is used to prevent violent extremism by spreading state-sanctioned 
Islam from the monarchy through the imams to the people. The teaching of Moroccan Islam 
promotes one Islam as the correct Islam to the Moroccan people, but also to many other nations 
in the region the Imam Training Program has partnerships with. In creating, funding, and 
executing this program as a response to the 2003 Casablanca Bombings and the creation of a 
spiritual security policy, the state has aimed to immunize the region against extremist rhetoric 
and violent acts of terror. While discouraging violence and promoting moderate Islam is positive, 
the larger effects of the program are in strengthening the power of the king as Commander of the 
Faithful and in limiting religious pluralism.  
 Extremism and fundamentalism are not limited to Islam and they are not limited to 
religion. They are also not solely the result of religious factors and therefore it is not best to fight 
them with a religious counter-narrative. Extremism and fundamentalism are the result of 
alienation, marginalization, and socioeconomic struggles and these issues are not confined to 
religious communities. People who faces these issues often have no hope, and those without 
hope become desperate, and desperate people do desperate things. These desperate things may 
include religious extremism, or they may include gang violence. The location of the community 
does not matter, but the extreme adversity they face does.  
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 Highly educated, moderate imams can provide guidance and ideas, but they cannot 
provide education, job, and health program. The Moroccan government can provide these things, 
but for the most part they are not, and they are continuing to receive international praise for their 
religious PVE efforts. The Moroccan government should be addressing the socioeconomic 
factors that lead to extremist ideology, instead of trying to use religion to fight something 
religion does not cause.  
 For further study I would suggest examining methods to address these socioeconomic 
issues. Also, I would suggest creating an accurate method by which to gather data to examine the 
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